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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 10-4789 
___________ 
 
JOSE JULIO ANDUJAR, 
     Petitioner 
 
v. 
 
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES, 
                                                        Respondent 
____________________________________ 
 
On Petition for Review of an Order of the 
Board of Immigration Appeals 
(Agency No. A034-040-212) 
Immigration Judge: Jesus Clemente 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
July 1, 2011 
 
Before:  BARRY, JORDAN and GARTH, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed July 5, 2011) 
_________ 
 
OPINION 
_________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
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 Jose Andujar, a citizen of the Dominican Republic, petitions for review of a 
decision from the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) that: found him barred from 
seeking asylum and withholding of removal by virtue of a federal drug conviction; found 
him ineligible for deferral of removal under the Convention Against Torture (CAT); 
denied his motion to remand; and ordered him removed.  For the reasons that follow, we 
will deny the petition for review.  
I. 
 Andujar was admitted to the United States as a lawful permanent resident in the 
mid-1970s.  Three decades later, he pleaded guilty in federal court to conspiracy to 
manufacture, possess and distribute cocaine hydrochloride, and he was sentenced to 
seventy-eight months in prison.  Based on that conviction, the Government charged 
Andujar with being removable under, inter alia, 8 U.S.C §§ 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) (aliens 
convicted of aggravated felonies are removable) and 1227(a)(2)(B)(i) (aliens convicted of 
controlled substance violations are removable).  (AR 564.)  Andujar conceded 
removability and filed defensive applications for asylum, withholding of removal and 
CAT protection, claiming a fear of persecution and torture at the hands of his drug 
trafficking co-conspirators. 
 An Immigration Judge in York, Pennsylvania, denied Andujar‟s applications for 
relief, and the BIA dismissed his appeal.  The BIA noted that Andujar had “not 
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challenge[d] the Immigration Judge‟s determination that his conviction constitutes an 
aggravated felony, thus precluding asylum.”  (AR 3.)  The BIA determined that “because 
[Andujar‟s] conviction for an aggravated felony resulted in a sentence of 78 months . . . 
his conviction is automatically a particularly serious crime per statute” (AR 3), thus 
precluding withholding of removal.  And it “agree[d] with the Immigration Judge that 
[Andujar] has not established that it is more likely than not that he would be tortured by 
anyone - either private actors or government officials - upon returning to the Dominican 
Republic.”  (AR 4.)  Regarding Andujar‟s claim on appeal that he is a non-removable 
United States national, the BIA found that Andujar conceded alienage before the IJ and 
that his new allegation—that he gave an “oath of allegiance” to the United States—was 
insufficient to prove nationality under Third Circuit precedent.  Finally, the BIA 
construed as a motion to remand proceedings new evidence submitted by Andujar on 
appeal, and denied the motion because the evidence was “cumulative of extensive 
evidence already of record concerning drug-related violence in the Dominican Republic.” 
 (AR 5.) 
II. 
 We generally have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(1) to review final orders 
of removal.  Where the BIA issues its own decision, we limit our review to the 
administrative record and the decision of the BIA.  See Demandstein v. Att‟y Gen., --- 
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F.3d ---, 2011 WL 652751, at *2 (3d Cir. Feb. 24, 2011, No. 10-1230).  Because Andujar 
was found removable for having committed an aggravated felony, our jurisdiction, and 
therefore the scope of our review, is further constrained by 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(C).  
Accordingly, we exercise jurisdiction only to the extent that we are called upon to 
determine either jurisdictional facts, see Salim v. Ashcroft, 350 F.3d 307, 308 (3d Cir. 
2003) (per curiam), or constitutional and legal claims.  Cospito v. Att‟y Gen., 539 F.3d 
166, 170 (3d Cir. 2008).  Our standard of review in those instances is plenary.  Denis v. 
Att‟y Gen., 633 F.3d 201, 205-06 (3d Cir. 2011); Jordon v. Att‟y Gen., 424 F.3d 320, 328 
(3d Cir. 2005). 
III. 
 We have reviewed the constitutional claims and questions of law raised in 
Andujar‟s opening brief and find them all to be lacking in merit.  In particular, we reject 
Andujar‟s claim that he has proven he is a non-removable “national,” as that term is 
defined in 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(22): “[t]he term „national of the United States‟ means (A) a 
citizen of the United States, or (B) a person who, though not a citizen of the United 
States, owes permanent allegiance to the United States.”  Andujar, an alien who allegedly 
made an oath of allegiance to the United States, is not a national under our precedent.  
See Salim, 350 F.3d at 309 (in determining whether petitioner is a national, “simply filing 
an application for naturalization” is not enough; “for one such as Salim who is a citizen of 
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another country, nothing less than citizenship will show „permanent allegiance to the 
United States.‟”); accord Lin v. United States, 561 F.3d 502, 508 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (“We 
join the majority of our colleagues and conclude manifestations of „permanent allegiance‟ 
do not, by themselves, render a person a U.S. national.”).1 
 In addition, we reject Andujar‟s claim that his due process rights were “violated by 
[the] INS when it did not inform the Petitioner that it had denied his application for 
naturalization in 1999, where the Petitioner only discovered this fact in 2009.”  Andujar 
fails to explain how the alleged lack of notice concerning USCIS‟s denial of his 
naturalization application implicates the validity of the underlying order of removal.  But 
even if this were a proper due process claim, there is no record support for Andujar‟s 
allegation that he did not receive notice that his naturalization application was denied and, 
in any event, he fails to adequately explain how he was prejudiced in any way by the lapse 
of time.  See Leslie v. Att‟y Gen., 611 F.3d 171, 175 (3d Cir. 2010) (“allegations of due 
                                              
 
1
  Regarding Salim, Andujar requests that we “revisit its holding and overrule it.”  
Under our Internal Operating Procedures, however, “this panel cannot overturn a prior 
panel‟s precedential opinion.”  Pareja v. Att‟y Gen., 615 F.3d 180, 190 (3d Cir. 2010); see 
IOP 9.1 (“no subsequent panel overrules the holding in a precedential opinion of previous 
panel.  Court en banc reconsideration is required to do so”).  Alternatively, Andujar notes 
our statement that “a panel of our Court may decline to follow a prior decision of our 
Court without the necessity of an en banc decision when the prior decision conflicts with 
a Supreme Court decision.”  United States v. Tann, 577 F.3d 533, 541 (3d Cir. 2009).  
But Andujar cites no Supreme Court decision, nor are we aware of one, that conflicts with 
the holding of Salim. 
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process violations must ordinarily be accompanied by an initial showing of substantial 
prejudice”) (citation and internal quotations omitted).2   
 Finally, we reject Andujar‟s claim that the termination of his social security 
benefits, by virtue of his anticipated removal, will “leave him as the anvil for a 
hammering bill of attainder.”  This claim is foreclosed by Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 
603, 612-21 (1960).  Deportation statutes are civil in nature and non-punitive in the 
constitutional sense, INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1038 (1984); Perez v. 
Elwood, 294 F.3d 552, 557 (3d Cir. 2002), a fact that obviates the ability of Andujar to 
demonstrate the existence of a bill of attainder.  See United States v. O‟Brien, 391 U.S. 
367, 384 n.30 (1968) (listing “punishment” as one of three “definitional elements” of 
legislation that constitutes a bill of attainder).
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2
  In denying the naturalization application, USCIS noted that its review of 
Andujar‟s nine criminal dispositions “indicate arrests from years 1980 to 1990,” and that 
“[i]t must be noted that you pled guilty to all of the charges that you were arrested for.  
No evidence has been provided to conclusively support your reported lifestyle change as 
you failed to provide any documentary substantiation.”  (AR 15.)  Notably, Andujar‟s 
removal was predicated on a criminal conviction that postdated the denial of his 
naturalization application by several years.  We fail to grasp the significance of any 
alleged lack of notice concerning USCIS‟s denial of the naturalization application.  
Andujar does not suggest that he would have abstained from criminal activity if only he 
had received prompt notice of USCIS‟s determination.    
 
 3  We disagree with Andujar‟s contention that the civil nature of immigration 
proceedings has changed following Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473 (2010).  See 
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IV. 
 Andujar‟s “motion for leave to abandon Convention Against Torture Act claim, 
and for lifting of any stay of removal in relation thereof,” is granted, although we note 
that there does not appear to be any stay in place.  His request for appointment of counsel 
is denied.  Andujar‟s petition for review will be denied.  
                                                                                                                                                  
Alvarado-Fonseca v. Holder, 631 F.3d 385, 391-92 (7th Cir. 2011) (In Padilla, “the Court 
noted that „deportation is a particularly severe „penalty,‟ and that removal proceedings, 
while „civil in nature,‟ are „intimately related to the criminal process.‟  However, the 
Court also reaffirmed that deportation „is not, in a strict sense, a criminal sanction.‟”) 
(internal citations omitted). 
